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Chapter 21:  Democratization 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Introduction box   Cuba v USA  
Which is the democracy? 
In 2000 Cuban Communist dictator Fidel Castro responded to confusion that 
surrounded the US Presidential elections by offering to send a team of ‘electoral 
advisors’ to teach the Americans about democracy. George Bush had defeated Al 
Gore despite polling fewer votes across the country, since he had won in a 
majority of states. However, in the state of Florida, upon which the result  
ultimately rested, Bush’s victory was disputed by many due to polling 
irregularities.   
 
There is a long history of antipathy between the US and its island neighbour 
dating back to the 1950s when Castro had masterminded a left wing revolution on 
the island and overthrown a US-backed dictatorship. In 1961 the US responded by 
backing an ultimately unsuccessful invasion to overthrow Castro and have 
imposed economic sanctions on the regime ever since. 
 
In the light of this backstory Castro was, of course, opportunistically riling his old 
foe but the episode did serve to highlight the ambiguous and contested nature of 
democracy. Could Cuba actually claim to be more democratic than the US? Why 
is democracy ‘claimed’ by states with such differing political systems? Why is 
democracy used in international relations by states seeking to defend themselves 
from criticism or in order to criticize others?  
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In this chapter you will explore: 
• what a democratic political system is and the different forms they take. 
• how and why the idea of democracy has spread internationally through the 
process of democratization. 
• different views on why democracy sometimes fails to take hold in states and 
yet, in other cases, becomes (apparently) permanent. 
• the debate on whether democracy can be imposed by force in a process of 
‘nation building’. 
• why some see democratization as crucial for justice, human rights and world 
peace but others dispute this.  
 
 
What is Democracy?  
 
Democracy is an old idea, originating in Ancient Greece, yet today its precise 
meaning is still contested and the best means of putting it into practise is not agreed 
upon. The word means ‘rule by the people’ combining the ancient Greek words demos 
(the people) and a derivation of kratos (rule by). In Ancient Greece Athenian 
Democracy sought to put this into practise by initiating mass meetings of all eligible 
citizens to make political decisions. Opinion at the time was divided as to the 
appropriateness of this method of decision making. The leading statesman of his day, 
Pericles, was a key architect of the system and drew praise from the likes of the 
renowned historian Thucydides for his stewardship of a government constrained by 
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regular popular votes. The Philosophers Socrates, Aristotle and Plato, however, were 
more sceptical of this democratic experiment, fearing that ‘mob rule’ might not be in 
the best interests of society. This debate persists today and is revisited later in this 
chapter. 
 
There is no agreed understanding of what ‘rule by the people’ actually means but a 
good starting point is the oft-quoted phrase used by US President Abraham Lincoln in 
his famous ‘Gettysburg address’ of 1863; “government of the people, by the people, 
for the people”. This phrase is useful for reminding us that there is more to democracy 
than voting as it has increasingly come to be portrayed. Democracy was pretty much 
forgotten for several centuries after Ancient Greece as monarchical rule dominated 
most of the world. It re-emerged emerged in its modern form with the rise of Liberal 
political thought in the 18th Century and, whilst it is debateable whether modern 
democracies are more democratic than Pericles’ Athens, the ‘of the people’ element 
has certainly advanced since the time of Lincoln. Only around 40,000 of the 250,000 
or so Ancient Athenians were actually citizens and thus entitled to vote. In particular, 
women and the large slave population were not involved in the political process. By 
contemporary standards this seems ‘undemocratic’ since the extension of the 
franchise (i.e. the right to vote) through the 20th Century generally saw women and all 
adult ‘citizens’ (usually bar prisoners) given the vote in modern ‘democracies’. 
Ancient Athens, however, can lay claim to be more democratic than most 
contemporary democracies in that its government was more clearly ‘by the people’ 
since over one sixth of them were effectively in the government. This could be said to 
have empowered people more than in the contemporary US where less than half of 
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those who voted got the President they wanted in 2000 and only 51% of the eligible 
adult citizens voted at all.  
 
In recent history balancing the ‘of the people’ and ‘by the people’ dimensions of 
democracy has become the key difficulty in applying the concept. Liberal Democracy 
from the 18th Century has focussed more on the former and come to see legitimate 
government as being not so much by the masses but by the consent of the masses, 
demonstrated through elections. Hence Liberal Democracy is usually distinguished 
from the Classic Democracy of Ancient Athens in that it is more about having a 
government accountable to the people than one which is directly ‘of them’ (which, 
with population growth, could also be argued to have become impractical). 
 
Within contemporary Liberal Democracies, however, there is still a balance to be 
established on how much ‘by the people’ you can or would want to have. At one end 
of the contemporary spectrum is ‘participatory’ or ‘popular’ democracy in which all 
citizens have a regular, direct input in decision-making in a kind of modern version of 
Athenian Democracy. In Switzerland, either as a whole or within its constituent 
Cantons, most significant political decisions are subject to a referendum of all eligible 
citizens. There is a central Swiss government but it has limited powers compared to 
most state executives. At the other end of the Liberal Democratic spectrum is 
Representative Democracy where the emphasis is more on elections than referenda or 
any other means of directly involving the public in decision-making. In this form of 
Liberal Democracy the justification for limiting the ‘by the people’ element is 
‘Burke’s principle’- named after the conservative Irish / British politician and thinker- 
that too much popular democracy undermines the role of elections and elected 
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officials. According to this principle politicians should be trusted to act on behalf of 
their citizens once they have been elected and be more than just delegates of them. 
They should look after their constituents interests but be prepared to act according to 
their conscience and expertise and not simply articulate the opinion of the majority of 
the people they represent.  In this view we should elect politicians to run the country 
on our behalf accepting that we have voted them in because they are better equipped 
than us to evaluate the political complexities and priorities of the day. All Liberal 
Democracies lie somewhere on a continuum between Representative and Popular 
democracy with none entirely one or the other. The UK, where referenda are rare, is a 
good example of a state towards the former end of the scale. 
 
Representative democracy, then, limits the ‘by the people’ element of the concept in 
the hope that this better serves the third element of Lincoln’s maxim and leads to 
decisions taken that are better ‘for the people’. Plato’s ‘mob rule’ argument is revived 
through concerns that ‘the people’ may take decisions not in the interest of ‘the 
people’. Nineteenth Century Liberals, like Alexis De Toqueville and John Stewart 
Mill revived this concern with the ‘tyranny of the majority’ argument that a popular 
vote should not be allowed to undermine individual liberty. Popular support for 
imprisoning or slaughtering people for their beliefs could not make such policies 
legitimate and truly ‘democratic’.  
 
The ‘for the people’ element of democracy is, of course, more subjective than other 
two and can lead to the concept being stretched well beyond the confines of Liberal 
Democracy.  Unelected Communist governments have frequently claimed to be 
‘people’s democracies’ in that they represent and act on behalf of ‘the people’, rather 
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than the minority elite interests catered for in previous monarchical or dictatorial 
regimes. Liberal Democracies may be accepted by Marxists to be an advance on such 
systems but can they really claim to be ‘for the people’ when, as Lenin observed of 
Britain, they are ‘a democracy for one second every five years’ (i.e. when casting a 
General Election vote)?. Mao went as far as describing his one party authoritarian 
Chinese government as a ‘people’s democratic dictatorship’. Whilst it is probably fair 
to say that much policy produced in Marxist / Maoist regimes, such as full 
employment and universal health and education, was ‘for the people’, the fact that 
Mao, Lenin, Stalin, Pol Pot and others slaughtered millions of their own people makes 
it hard to rank such characters alongside Pericles, Lincoln, Mill and Nelson Mandela 
in the ranks of history’s notable democrats.   
 
Democracy is more than just free and fair elections, something dismissed by critics as 
mere ‘electorialism’ (Karl 1995). It is now widely accepted that full or ‘substantive 
democracy’ (Grugel 2002: 65-6) also necessitates elements of pluralism or what US 
political scientist Robert Dahl has refereed to as ‘polyarchy’ (rule by many), in which 
ordinary citizens can influence the political process in a variety of ways other than 
through elections (see box 21.1). This notion of  ‘active citizenship’ is, however, 
difficult to measure with any exactitude and free and fair elections remain the most 
straightforward and unambiguous indicator of democracy in today’s world, if not an 
entirely satisfactory one.  
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The Three Waves of Democratization 
 
As introduced in Chapter One, US academic Samuel Huntington popularised the idea 
of democratization as having occurred in three broad waves over the last three 
centuries, interspersed by two counter-waves when anti-democratic authoritarianism 
has resurged (Huntington 1991). Critics have opined that Huntington’s definition of 
democracy is limited by electoralism and reflects a Western and, in particular, a US 
bias (Grugel 2002: 34-5, Pettiford 2004: 37-8) but the notion of ebbs and flows within 
the general progression of global democratization is widely accepted as a broadly 
accurate analysis of the phenomenon. Box 21.2 bears this out.  
 
 
 
 
Book box 21.1 Dahl’s 7 criteria for a democracy 
1. Control over politicians after election. 
2.  Free and fair elections 
3.  Universal adult suffrage 
4.  Right to run for public office 
5.  Freedom of expression 
6.  Access to non-governmental sources of information 
7.  Freedom of association 
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box 21.2 timeline of democratization- percentage of democratic states since 1870   
(figures derived from Colomer (2007), Polity IV & Freedom House)
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The First Wave 
 
The influential French political writer Alexis De Tocqueville, whilst conducting 
research on the US political system in 1835, prophesized that the embryonic 
American democracy he had come to admire would soon be copied throughout the 
world in a global revolution (see box 21.3). Though the idea of democracy has 
developed and spread since then, it has proved more evolutionary than revolutionary. 
A ‘long wave’ of progress from the birth of Liberalism grew when many Western 
European and North American states underwent industrialization. The governments of 
these states were then compelled to respond to the demands of a new working class 
and initiated reforms that empowered the masses. However, the first of what were to 
be three interregnums in global democratization came sometime in the 1920s and 30s. 
Both the starting and ending points of this first wave of democratisation are 
debateable. Huntington suggests it began in the US in the time of De Tocquville in the 
late 1820s. Dahl considers that it can be traced back further to the birth of liberalism 
and republicanism (the abandonment of monarchical rule) in the late 18th century 
(Dahl 1971). Grugel, however, contends that it is more appropriate to see the starting 
point of democratization as in the 1870s, by when the expansion of the franchise had 
come to include most of the ‘demos’, or adult citizenship, in some European 
countries, North America and British colonial states (Grugel 2002: 37).  
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World War One weakened many countries, both politically and economically, and 
this furthered with the onset of the Great Depression from 1929. Discontent with the 
Western economic and political model manifested itself in the rise to popularity of 
radical socialism, prompting the response of a right wing authoritarian backlash from 
box 21.3 Alexis  De Tocqueville Democracy in America 
 
Published in two volumes, in 1835 and 1840, after De Tocqueville had been 
despatched by the French government to study the penal system in the United 
States, Democracy in America is revered on both sides of the Atlantic both as a 
classic social and political history of the age and as a prophetic treatise on the 
future of democracy and democratization. De Tocqueville was so taken by the 
US that his research expanded well beyond studying the prison system and he 
produced a wide, comparative study of the political system, economy and 
society he felt was a model for France and for the world. A strong independent 
judiciary, checks on government power, a free press and involving people in 
public affairs (such as through jury service and local government) were 
highlighted as both essential to the establishment of democracy and for avoiding 
purely self-serving individualism from undermining democratic rule through 
‘the tyranny of the majority’. With such institutions in place De Tocqueville 
prophecized that democracy would soon spread around the world in a process 
that would be ‘irresistible and universal’. 
(De Tocqueville 1863) 
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elites in many states.  In the 1920s and 30s the political systems of Germany, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain and Italy moved in an authoritarian direction and, by the outbreak of 
the Second World War, Britain and the states of Benelux and Scandinavia were the 
only substantive democracies remaining in Europe (Switzerland is excluded from this 
categorization on the basis that the right to vote and stand in national elections was 
not extended to women until 1971). Even those beacons of democracy in France, 
Britain and the US experienced severe social discontent in the inter-war years as 
people began to feel disillusioned with capitalism and party politics and become 
attracted to authoritarian alternatives of both the right and left. In France a prolonged 
period of political crisis saw 36 different governments take office in the 21 inter-war 
years. With the rise in popularity of Fascism and Marxism the first wave of 
democratization receded and showed little sign of being succeeded by a second at the 
outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. 
 
The Second Wave 
The allied triumph over Nazism, Fascism and Japanese monarchical ultra-nationalism 
in World War Two boosted democracy (though also Communism) and prompted a 
second wave, but the clash that ensued between ‘The West’ and The Communist 
world ensured that this wave was far shorter in duration than the first. West Germany, 
Japan and Italy were democratized by force and, as decolonization redrew the word 
map,  many newly independent counties, like India and Israel, embraced democracy at 
their birth. This proved to be a short wave, however, since the prioritisation of the 
West was resisting the spread of Communism rather than promoting Liberal 
Democracy and Cold War geopolitics saw right wing authoritarian governments 
hostile to Communism propped up by the US and her allies. It is pertinent to 
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remember that the Cold War was more of a struggle between Communism and 
Capitalism than between authoritarianism and democracy as it is sometimes painted in 
the West. The Western alliance were sometimes happy to undermine democracy in 
the cause of deterring Communism. An elected Iranian government was deposed by 
the British and Americans in 1953 after nationalizing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
(a predecessor of British Petroleum) in order to ensure Western control of the Persian 
Gulf oilfields.  Similarly, US support helped snuff out democracy in Guatemala in 
1954 and Chile in 1973 when elections delivered leftist governments on their 
doorstep. Armed border disputes between newly-independent India and Pakistan saw 
the US backing the Pakistani dictatorship over the fledgling democracy who received 
the support of the Soviets. 
 
Additionally, many of the democracies that emerged from the wave of decolonisation 
that swept large swathes of the world after 1945 proved to be weak and saw countries 
like Nigeria and Cameroon drift to authoritarianism as the key groups which had 
secured independence, and particularly the ‘strongmen’ who had assumed the 
Presidency, also sought to secure their long-term political dominance. Even the 
beacon of Third World democracy, India, briefly flirted with authoritarian rule when 
Indira Ghandi introduced emergency rule in 1975 in response to internal unrest 
following allegations of electoral corruption. In 1960 nine of the ten Latin South 
American states had competitive electoral systems but by 1973 only Venezuela and 
Colombia had not reverted to military government.  Indeed, in 1971 there were only 
25 democratic governments in the world, all of which were in Western Europe or 
former Western European colonies with the isolated exception of Japan. Hence the 
Second Wave of democratization had come to an end by the early 1970s. 
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The Third Wave 
A 3rd wave of democratization began to emerge in the mid 1970s when Spain and 
Portugal abandoned military dictatorship and a lessening of repression in the Soviet 
bloc sowed the seeds of post-Communist transition that occurred across most of 
Eastern Europe over a decade later. The ending of the Cold War between 1989 and 
1991 served to accelerate the progress of democratization on both sides of the Iron 
Curtain. The 1989 revolutions which swept through the six ‘Eastern Bloc’ Soviet 
satellite states took the world by surprise and heralded a major retreat from 
Communism and a rejuvenation of Liberal Democracy as people ‘voted with their 
feet’ for a Western European model of rule. The USSR’s subsequent transformation 
has been less complete, with states like Russia and Georgia only partly embracing 
democracy and others such as Belarus remaining firmly autocratic, but several 
successor states have also become fully-fledged democracies. Communist Yugoslavia 
broke up later in the 1990s in similar, though much bloodier, fashion and has 
gradually spawned five new democracies. 
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The current state of play with democratization 
Despite three waves of democratization advancing the idea further than ever before a 
majority of the world’s countries still live under undemocratic political systems. Even 
amongst ‘transition states’, such as Russia, some question whether substantive 
democracy will be the end point of the process. It has been suggested that only around 
a fifth of the countries undergoing democratic transition in the twenty-first century 
were clearly set to stabilize as fully-fledged liberal democracies (Carothers 2002).  It 
seems that the end of history is not yet with us. China, home to one sixth of the 
world’s people, has modernized and embraced global capitalism but shows little 
likelihood of abandoning its one party system. Similarly Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea 
and Belarus are ruled in much the same way as they were during the Cold War. 
Absolutist monarchical rule remains in Saudi Arabia and Swaziland and military 
box 21.4  Francis Fukuyama The End of History and the Last Man  
 
US academic Fukuyama epitomized the optimism of the New World Order in 
the early 1990s with his prophecy that the end of the Cold War marked the ‘end 
of history’. Fukuyama reasoned that the ideological triumph of Liberalism over 
Communism was an ultimate victory that had set the world on a course for a new 
future, in which Liberal Democracy had established itself as the final form of 
government. For sure the end of democratization had not yet come but no other 
serious challenges to the ascendancy of this form of government now existed 
and its full globalization was assured and with it world peace since democracies 
conduct their relations with each other in peace.  
 (Fukuyama 1992) 
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dictatorships persist in Burma, Libya and Syria. Additionally, a number of African 
Third Wave ‘democracies’, such as Zimbabwe and Algeria have gone backwards and 
reverted to more authoritarian and elitist forms of governance in a similar fashion to 
the 1960s reversals elsewhere in the Continent. Governance of any sorts- let alone 
democracy- is elusive in ‘failed states’, like Sierra Leone, Congo, Sudan and Somalia 
which have emerged over the last two decades due to persistent civil wars and a lack 
of international interest (See Chapter 28).  
 
Contemporary Russia has properly structured general elections and a range of 
political parties but is considered by many not to be a democracy since its electoral 
process is manipulated by a small elite (for example by only ever allowing 
government election broadcasts to be televised) who often appear to run the country 
more for the convenience of a handful of oligarchs (powerful businessmen) than ‘the 
people’. More charitably Russia could be described as a ‘semi-democracy’ as could 
the political systems of Malaysia, Singapore, Egypt and Tunisia where regular 
elections are held but the same party inevitable wins through stifling opposition 
voices. It is worth noting, however, that Vladimir Putin’s authoritarianism, whilst 
criticized by some, is not altogether unpopular with the Russian demos who have no 
popular collective memory of democracy and many instead observe how their lives 
and their country’s influence in the world have diminished in the period since 
elections and a party system were introduced. Russians, after all, have more political 
freedom than they  and their parents had under the Communists but they also have 
less job security and can barely conceive that their country was once ahead of the US 
in the ‘space race’. 
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Many have come to contend that, for from coming to an end, history is repeating itself 
with another anti-democratic tide emerging against the third wave of democratization. 
This may even be something of a coordinated response with countries irritated at their 
marginalization and interference in their affairs from democratic states finding 
common ground and banding together in diplomatic and economic coalitions. Russia 
and China, whose relations were frosty even whilst on the same side of the Cold War- 
owing to their differing interpretations of Marxist doctrine- have increasingly turned 
to each other for economic and diplomatic support since 1991. The two have 
developed cooperative strategies through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and 
also sought the support of international pariah states like Iran, Belarus and Zimbabwe. 
(Diamond 2008: 86) 
 
 
What can make democracy permanent? 
 
Democracy, then, can unravel and it is far form certain that a country which has 
introduced competitive elections will continue on this path. Explanations for how 
democracy can become entrenched as a political system are varied, and differ from 
case to case, but a number of key factors are most frequently cited: 
 
• military defeat 
Military defeat is likely to undermine a military-based government since the armed 
forces will have been weakened as will any legitimacy they may have with the general 
public as guarantors of their security. Greece’s defeat by Turkey over Cyprus in 1974 
and Argentina’s by the UK over the Falklands eight years later marked the beginning 
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of the end of military rule in those countries and a return to democracy which has, 
thus far, been sustained. The inability of Portugal’s Salazar regime to suppress 
colonial uprisings in Angola, Mozambique and Equatorial Guinea similarly 
undermined that system’s ‘strong man’ credibility and made democracy unstoppable.  
 
• consensus on the need for a new start 
Democracy can unravel if, when the going gets tough, people’s faith in the system 
weakens and they either desire a return to the certainties of the old order or, at least, 
are not inclined to do much to prevent the old elites from assuming control again. the 
commitment of ordinary Russians to Liberal Democracy has been less than many of 
their Slavic neighbours and, whilst a return to the old Communist order has been 
resisted by the elites, the country has reverted to a more authoritarian form of rule. In 
contrast, the 1989 anti-Communist revolutions in East Europe set six countries 
(Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria) with little 
liberal tradition on what now seems an irreversible democratic path because there was 
such widespread support for change that, even when change made life more difficult 
for many as transition produced higher levels of unemployment and poverty, there 
was insufficient support for a return to a centrally-planned economy and one party 
rule.  
 
• a good standard of living 
A number of works on democratization have emphasized a correlation between 
economic development and the stabilization of democratic rule. Industrialization 
brings greater wealth to a country and with it social change as a large proportion of 
the population abandon  peasantry or subsistence farming for work in new industries 
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vital to the government and national economy (Lipset 1959, Przeworski et al 2000). 
This link is, to some extent, indisputable. Most developed states are democracies and 
most non-democracies are relatively poor states.  Democratization did accompany the 
industrial revolution in many states during the first wave as a working class emerged 
to fuel industrialization and then become empowered as a result. Over time, however, 
the correlation between economic growth and democracy has become less clear. 
Germany and Italy did not follow the examples of the US, UK and France in the early 
20th Century and evolve into substantive democraices whilst, later, India democratized 
well before it industrialized. The Soviet Union achieved an economic miracle under 
brutal authoritarian rule and China later followed suit by embracing capitalism but not 
democracy. Oil rich Gulf states, like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, have similarly seen 
their people enriched but not significantly empowered. 
 
Whilst it is evident that a good standard of living does seem to help facilitate 
democracy, modern industrialized living may even serve to undermine democratic 
rule. Some analysts and political voices have come to suggest that the lobbying power 
of big business can create a new elite that distorts the link between the demos and the 
government and undermining the notion of polyarchy discussed earlier. Prominent US 
government adviser Robert Reich has even gone as far as to assert that ‘capitalism is 
killing democracy’ (Reich 2007). 
 
• a diverse economy 
A significant exception to the norm of democracy accompanying industrialization  
can be seen with states whose authoritarian rule is actually strengthened with 
economic growth due to the ‘resource curse theory’. Economic development based on 
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a particular, abundant natural resource can inhibit democracy since control over this 
sector of the economy becomes more important to the elites for maintaining control 
than popular support (Acemoglu & Robinson 2006). Hence a number of major oil 
exporters, such as Libya, Saudi Arabia and Equatorial Guinea, have continued to 
grow economically in recent decades without any commensurate empowerment of 
their populaces. Similarly, in a more complex manner, Russian political elites have 
needed to pay more attention to keeping the support of the handful of ‘oligarchs’ who 
bought up control of state industries that were rapidly privatized in the 1990s, than the 
general public. 
 
• civil society 
Some analysts of democracy take a more sociological approach to explaining the 
establishment of this form of rule. As discussed earlier, there is more to democracy 
than elections and it is increasingly acknowledged that involving a significant 
proportion of society in public life through polyarchy is integral to permanent 
democratization.  De Tocqueville, early in the history of Liberal Democracy, noted 
the importance of individuals cooperating in ‘associations’ in sustaining American 
democracy. Central to polyarchy is the notion of a civil society defined by British 
democracy specialist David Held as; 
 
“areas of social life- the domestic world, the economic sphere, cultural 
activities and political interaction- which are organized by private or voluntary 
arrangements between individuals and groups outside of the direct control of 
the state”  
 (Held, 1987: 281). 
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Civil society provides crucial links between government and the demos and can keep 
a check on the executive, ensuring that it is not allowed to slide back towards 
authoritarianism. Pressure groups in Turkey advanced democracy in that country by 
exposing the failings of the democratically elected government in acting ‘for the 
people’ in their lack of preparation for the devastating earthquakes of 1999. Turkey 
had not reverted to military rule since 1983 but was not a substantive democracy since 
civilians had little connection with public life and the military remained the dominant 
influence on government. In the wake of the earthquakes, however, several small 
voluntary groups stepped in to provide relief and, in doing so, were empowered by 
being able to expose government weakness and convince ordinary Turks of their 
entitlement to safeguards from earthquake damage of the sort enjoyed in other 
countries (Keyman & Icduygu 2003).  
 
Civil Society depends on communication so this, too, is a key driver of 
democratization. Closed societies can inhibit democratic challenges to governing 
elites. The paranoid Caecescu regime in 1970s and 1980s Romania went as far as 
banning photocopiers since this seemingly innocent form of office technology is a key 
means of producing protest leaflets. Such methods of restricting protest, allied to far 
more heavy handed forms of suppression, appeared to have successfully stifled any 
opposition to Caecescu but, in late December of 1989, his regime was quickly toppled 
in line with the revolutions in the neighbouring Eastern bloc states. The unfolding of 
these nearby revolutions was not reported in the Romanian media but many 
Romanians had learned of the events by accessing relatively free uncensored 
broadcasts from Yugoslavia. These broadcasts were also able to reveal to Romanians 
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the full horrors of a recent government massacre of peaceful protestors and, 
consequently, many were moved to action.  
 
In a similar vein, the 1992 Thai ‘cell phone revolution’ occurred when pro-democracy 
activists were able to respond to the military government’s attempt to suppress a 
popular uprising by cutting down telephone lines by using their mobile phones 
instead. After 17 coups in 60 years the military’s grip on the reins of power in 
Thailand was significantly weakened (though not removed altogether). Another 
example of communications technology advancing democracy can be seen in the 
1998 overthrow of the Suharto regime in Indonesia after 32 years of sometimes brutal 
rule which, in the main, was achieved through a peaceful democratic revolution 
focused on the internet and other forms of mass media (Hill & Sen 2000). In 2009 the 
world witnessed the latest variant of IT-based political revolt when the- ultimately 
unsuccessful- ‘Twitter Revolution’ challenged the authenticity of President 
Ahmadinejad’s electoral victory in Iran. Iranian authorities had acted to suppress 
opposition expressed on web sites and more traditional media but the multi-faceted 
nature of the online blogging system (accessible via emails or phones and constructed 
in a way to withstand hacking) made it much harder to contain. Hence messages 
calling on Iranians to march in opposition to the government and informing the rest of 
the world of their struggle proved impossible to contain. 
 
Social activism can bring down governments but also needs to be evident after a 
democratic revolution if democracy is to be sustained, which is not always the case. 
British political scientist Richard Rose considers that a key factor behind many ‘3rd 
wave democracies’ failing to complete the process is that they have ‘democratized 
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backwards’ compared to ‘first wave democracies’. In establishing competitive 
elections before other democratic norms which check the power of government, such 
as a constitution, and permitting private non-governmental organizations to flourish, 
countries like Russia have not followed the model of most of the world’s mature 
democracies which became modern states with an active citizenship before the full 
extension of the franchise. (Rose & Shin 2001) 
 
• force of example 
The democratic waves metaphor is supported by the tendency for neighbouring states 
to often follow suit in undergoing democratic revolution or reform in a process 
referred to by Huntington as ‘snowballing’ (Huntington 1991: 100-106). Spain and 
Portugal moved from Right Wing Dictatorships to democracy almost simultaneously 
between 1974 and 1977.  Ten Latin American states democratized in the six years 
which followed the 1979 revolution in Ecuador. Even more dramatically, democracy 
was ushered in in East Germany, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Bulgaria and Romania within the space of the latter six months of 1989. Pro-
democracy activists can be inspired by successes from like-minded groups in 
neighbouring countries and, equally, authoritarian governments can be persuaded that 
the ‘game is up’ by observing similar regimes lose legitimacy and topple. The 
Czechoslovak ‘Velvet Revolution’ of 1989 was so named as it proved to be a 
bloodless transition to democracy in which the ruling Communist Party simply stood 
aside in the face of mass public protest and the recent fall of the Communist parties in 
Poland and Hungary.  
  
• help from established democracies 
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Long standing members of the democratic club of nations can play a key role in 
ensuring that new entrants remain within their ranks by providing incentives to both 
join and stay in the club. With the end of the Cold War US foreign policy in the 1990s 
shifted from the ‘Truman Doctrine’ of supporting any anti-communist regime to the 
‘Clinton Doctrine’ of encouraging democratic change in some Global South countries 
through gentle diplomatic pressure and by linking this to the amount of development 
aid being allocated.  This shift was actually a furthering of a similar, short-lived 
initiative in the late 1970s in the aftermath of the 1975 Helsinki Accords (see Chapter 
22) when propping up Right Wing dictatorships came to appear hypocritical in the 
context of pushing for human rights reform in the Communist world. For example, the 
Carter administration in 1977 initiated the annual production of a state department 
report on the state of human rights in all countries of the world and approved the 
creation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (see Chapter 22). Realpolitik 
returned to US foreign policy in the 1980s, however, as the 2nd Cold War took shape 
and again in the aftermath of the September 11 2001 attacks when dictators 
suppressing Islamic fundamentalism, such as former Soviet Communist Karimov of 
Uzbekistan, came to be viewed in a similar perspective to those suppressing Marxist 
revolutionaries in the 1950s and 60s. 
 
A clearer and more consistent case of democratic promotion has come from the 
European integration process since the 1950s. The EC / EU has greatly advanced 
European democratization in two localized waves by opening its doors firstly to the 
military dictatorships of Spain, Portugal and Greece in the 1980s and then, secondly 
in the first decade of the twenty-first century, to ten former Communist states. These 
countries have seen their living standards improve by a combination of being part of 
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the world’s biggest and richest trading bloc and by being in receipt of redistributed 
funds from the richer members. NATO have followed suit since the end of the Cold 
War in opening their doors only to states with impeccable democratic and human 
rights credentials. This had not been a precondition in earlier times when Greece, 
Turkey and Portugal had been recruited whilst under military rule. 
 
Some consider that the successes of the EU / NATO model of democratization 
demonstrates that the carrot is better than the stick and the longer game of establishing 
‘linkages’ with new democracies is a more fruitful policy than the ‘leverage’ of 
relying on diplomatic pressure or intervention to create permanent change (Levitsky 
& Way 2005). The use of the ‘big stick’ of full scale military intervention has of late 
been employed to promote democracy and is assessed in the next section. 
 
 
Democratization by force- ‘nation building’ 
 
A core contemporary debate on how democracy can be made permanent has emerged 
in light of the post-Cold War UN operations in Bosnia and Kosovo and US-led 
interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and, more particularly, the processes of 
supervized ‘nation building’ which have followed the initial military campaigns. 
Although often viewed as a contemporary phenomenon, some strong historical 
precedence for attempts at democratization by force can be seen with the post-world 
War Two allied occupations of Germany, Italy and Japan. As the Iraqi and Afghan 
occupations have unfolded, attempts have been made to see what can be learned from 
25 
 
these past successes and applied to their contemporary equivalents (see Case Study 
box).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
 
Case Study box   Can you build a democratic nation? 
 
The prominent US international affairs think tank, the RAND Corporation, have been at the forefront of 
research on nation building and, drawing on historical precedent for such ventures, have reached the 
following conclusions.   
 
• Prior democratic experience, economic development and national homogeneity facilitate nation-
building but the crucial factor is the level of effort given to the process. 
• Multilateral nation-building is more complex than unilateral but more realistic in terms of sharing 
the burden and cost. 
• Multilateral nation-building is more likely to produce lasting change and regional reconciliation 
than unilateral. 
• The more troops that are committed the fewer the casualties that will be suffered. 
• The support of neighbouring states is important and should be sought. 
• Providing reconciliation for past injustices is important but may be too difficult to achieve. 
• Nation-building takes a long time- at least five years. 
 
Dobbins et al  (2003) 
 
RAND have built up a strong body of research on this theme of externally enforced nation building as 
the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan have evolved and become more contentious (Dobbins et al 
2007). Whilst accepting that such endeavours must inevitably be costly and long-term, they nonetheless 
remain positive and reason that it is possible to democratize by force. Many others have come to disagree 
and consider that the quagmires faced by the US and their allies in occupying Afghanistan and Iraq, after 
initial military successes, is testimony to the fact that democratization by force can perhaps only be 
possible in exceptional circumstances. Additionally, it could be argued that imposing a particular form of 
political system on another country is fundamentally undemocratic.  
 
Reflective Question- How will history judge the Occupation of Iraq? 
The occupation of Iraq has proved to be extremely controversial and, some would say, even counter-
productive since it has intensified radical Islamist groups opposition to Western imperialism around the 
world. Some defenders of the occupation, however, have suggested that history may come to view the 
‘nation-building’ exercize in a more positive light. In, say, 50 years time if Iraq is a stable Liberal 
Democracy with cordial relations with its neighbouring states and a strong economy built on oil exports, 
might the turmoil, expense and bloodshed of the past decade actually be viewed as having been worth it 
in the long run?  
What do you think of this proposition?   
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The scale of the breakdown of governance in Afghanistan and Iraq was not 
anticipated in advance of the conflicts. In particular, the collapse of law and order has 
posed a particularly acute problem for the occupiers, most notably with the vacuum 
created with the dismantling of Saddam’s police force. The successes of the post-
World War Two nation building exercises stand in stark contrast to their post-Cold 
War equivalents. RAND acknowledge that West Germany, Italy and Japan, as 
developed states with some experience of democratic reform, were more easily ‘built’ 
than Iraq and Afghanistan. It could be added that the World War Two axis powers had 
also been more clearly militarily defeated and pacified. It is still worth noting, 
however, that colossal time, expense and effort were expended by the US and their 
allies in the nation building exercizes in Germany, Japan and Italy. In relative terms 
the US was far richer in 1945 than in 2001 and also driven by a fear of Communism 
that was far greater, even, than the fear of terrorism produced by the September 11th 
2001 strikes (at least in the government) prompting an unparalleled level of finance 
for the foreign policy aims of the Truman Doctrine. Troop deployments, sometimes 
topping one and a half million in Germany and over a third of a million in Japan, were 
stationed for several generations. Many- particularly of the latter deployment- are still 
there today. 
 
Set against this the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have been comparatively 
small-scale and yet, at the same time, trying to build a nation from a more divided and 
hostile population lacking any of the democracy-enabling characteristics listed in the 
previous section. To make more contemporary comparisons, UN-led nation building 
in the post-Yugoslav states of Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina and in facilitating 
East Timor’s secession form Indonesia have also been smoother since a majority (or 
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at least a large proportion in Bosnia) see the occupiers as liberators and have 
welcomed democratic change. Even in these ‘successes’, however, the process has 
been far from straightforward and, possibly, not yet completed. Law and order has 
deteriorated during the occupations in Bosnia and particularly Kosovo, with organized 
crime flourishing and spilling over into the rest of Europe. An exit strategy for the 
West is still problematic since Serb nationalism and Russian power politics see 
independent and Western-oriented Bosnian and Kosovan states as counter to their 
own national interests. The full handover of power to the local population has proved 
more difficult than anticipated with critics suggesting that these states, instead of 
independent democracies, had become European Raj’s (as with Indian regions under 
British colonial rule) ruled as Western puppet states with only trappings of local 
empowerment (Knaus & Martin 2003).  
 
Ultimately, however, comparisons between the post 1945 and post 2001 nation-
building exercizes are misleading since the nations in Germany, Japan and Italy were 
already built. In these situations these were actually cases of ‘state-building’; a 
reconstruction of political institutions and the economy in a Western, democratic 
manner. Though they have come to frequently be used interchangeably, the terms 
nation and state are not the same thing and the significance of this is beyond a matter 
of academic semantics. Whilst a state is a legally-definable concept- a territory with 
people, ruled by a single government- a nation defies such an objective definition. A 
nation is a subjective and social construct; a group of people sharing common social 
characteristics they feel distinquish themselves from other groups of people (see 
Chapter 20). Despite periods of brutal rule, the vast majority of the native populations 
in the allied occupied territories after 1945 were Germans, Japanese and Italians 
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unified by language, ethnicity and cultural norms which distinquished them from 
other nations. The same is broadly true of Kosovans and East Timorians (though not 
of the more divided Bosnians). Iraq and Afghanistan, in contrast, are not, never have 
been and probably never will be ‘nations’. Iraq was artificially carved out of the 
Turkish Ottoman Empire by Western powers at the end of the First World War and 
was always an uneasy hotch-potch of Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs and Kurds held 
together only by repressive government. Afghanistan, similarly, is an artificial relic of 
the British Empire; an ethnically-diverse land only ever united historically in resisting 
foreign occupations. Whilst there are precedents for externally-supervized state 
reconstruction and democratisation, there are none for doing this in addition to 
‘nation-building’. 
 
 
Is Democratization Important for international relations? 
 
Even amongst democrats opinion on whether the active promotion of democratization 
should form part of a state’s foreign policy is divided. Is democracy something that 
should be promoted diplomatically or, even forcibly? What significance do liberal 
democratic political systems have for international relations?  
 
• Liberals 
Liberalism as an ideology is most closely associated with democracy and Liberal 
approaches to IR tend to view the active promotion of liberal democracy as making 
sense both in moral and security terms. Democracy enhances human security since 
democratically accountable governments are compelled to respond to people’s needs 
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and demands when they may have reason not to do so out of a sense of duty and 
responsibility. Human rights can be enshrined in constitutional systems limiting the 
power of government over their citizens and avoiding the tyranny of the majority 
dilemma. Governments can also be held to account by democracy in terms of 
delivering basic entitlements to their people, such as food and welfare (see 
entitlements thesis, chapter 18).  
 
Liberals also see the promotion of democracy as a basis for achieving peaceful and 
ordered international relations through the firmly held conviction that ‘democracies 
do not go to war with each other’. This proposition is well-supported empirically, so 
the fact that more and more states in the world have embraced democracy in recent 
years has given scope for optimism in the realization of Kant’s vision, expressed in 
Perpetual Peace in the 18th Century. Kant, in fact, proposed that it was the trinity of 
democracy, trade and international cooperation were the basis for a peaceful world 
and these three factors are all more prominent today than at any point previously in 
history. Over two centuries after its promulgation, the Kantian peace proposition has 
been rigorously tested by Liberal Pluralists for its applicability to the contemporary 
global political system. Russet and Oneal’s ‘Triangulating Peace’, for example, draws 
on over a decade of statistical analysis with each of these three corners of the ‘peace 
triangle’ examined in turn to show how they mutually reinforce each other over time 
in ‘virtuous circles’ (Russet & Oneal 2001). Democracies trade with each other more 
and form common organizations more, both of which are phenomena also 
demonstrably contributing to pacific relations. Democracies in dealing with other 
democracies more easily find non-military means to resolve inevitable clashes of 
interest that arise in their relations and increasingly realize that their interests are not 
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served by violent confrontations. Democratic peace is a political theory with 
uncharacteristically solid empirical foundations if we consider that: ‘(e)stablished 
democracies fought no wars against each other during the entire twentieth century’ 
(Russett & Starr 1996: 173). If we also consider that number of democratic states in 
the world has increased in recent years the future prospects for perpetual peace look 
good also. Both of these sets of figures are challengeable, but the overall trends they 
indicate are not. This democratic peace thesis is explored in more detail in chapter 27. 
 
 
• (Classical) Realists 
Realists are likely to be democrats since it is a school of thought closely associated 
with conservative politics in the Western world but IR traditionalists- in contrast to 
Neo-Conservatives- tend to see democracy as largely irrelevant to the achievement of 
peace. From a Realist perspective, conflicts of national interest inevitably occur in 
Box 21.5 The ‘Neo-Cons’ and democratization 
 
It is possible to see democratization by force as a manifestation of Liberal foreign 
policy even though much Liberal political opinion was opposed to the Iraq War 
and occupation. Liberalism in IR is not always synonymous with liberalism as an 
ideology. The ‘Neo-Conservative’ thinkers, who were the key advocates of the US 
nation-building exercises in Iraq and Afghanistan are, as their name implies, 
located on the right of the US politics but their belief in forcibly planting seeds of 
democracy in the Middle East is not conventionally Realist in that it is a morally-
driven foreign policy and as such Idealist (see chapter 7). 
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relations between countries, be they democratic or not, and the best means of 
managing this is to pay respect to the balance of power and not the promotion of ideas 
and ideals (the term Idealism was coined by Realists intending to denigrate Liberalism 
in international relations as unrealistic). Imposing values on others is only likely to 
fuel resentment. Sovereignty should be respected and it should be left up to others to 
decide if they want to have a democratic political system or not. 
 
• (Neo) Realists  
A key reason for the metamorphosis of most Realist thought to Neo-Realism from the 
1970s was the belief that the international political system was no longer entirely 
anarchic but becoming a ‘society of states’ in which values could and should play 
some role. Neo-Realists remain far more protective of sovereignty than Liberals and 
continue to see peace as being more about maintaining the balance of power than 
democratic peace but those of the ‘English School’ variant see a society of mature 
democratic states as the best means of advancing human rights and governance in the 
human interest (Dunne & Wheeler 2002). Democratization  represents the best way of 
ensuring that politics in a globalizing world is ‘for the people’, rather than moving 
towards forms of global governance advocated by Liberals which Neo-Realists see as 
undermining both sovereignty and democracy (see chapter 33). 
 
• Marxists 
As referred to earlier in the chapter, Marxists consider themselves to be democrats 
but, for them, the achievement of global peace and justice is not about Liberal 
Democracy. For Marxists a ‘people’s democratization’ of the world could only be 
achieved through global structural change; the abandonment of capitalism. 
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• Social Constructivists 
Social Constructivism is less associated with any particular ideology than the other IR 
approaches so does not have such a clear position on whether promoting democracy is 
a good idea or not. However, this school of thought’s particular emphasis on the 
importance of culture in the conduct of international relations does lead many of its 
advocates to be sceptical of democratic peace since the culture of democratic 
promotion, rather than pacifying the world, can push some countries into war. Hence 
in this view, the post Cold War nation building exercizes have been the result of 
cultural clashes with ‘warlike democracies’ feeling righteously driven to confront 
non-believers in a modern form of crusade (Risse 1995). From this perspective, then, 
democratisation could actually be a source of conflict rather than peace. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The meaning of democracy and its significance in international relations is disputed 
and the progress of democratization is also open to different interpretations. Two 
decades on from the end of the Cold War we are still not at the ‘end of history’ but 
Liberal Democracy does appear to be the world’s most popular form of government. 
In spite of notable reversals, the general long term trend is for countries to continue on 
a democratic trajectory. Perhaps, as Churchill famously opined; ‘democracy is the 
worst form of government except for all those other forms that have been tried from 
time to time’ (Churchill 1947).   
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A reversion to authoritarianism for the world’s established democracies seems 
unlikely in the contemporary climate and, whilst it may take a long time to become 
established, democracy tends not to go away completely in countries where it has 
been tried but then abandoned. “Attempts at democratization, even when they fail or 
only partially succeed, form part of the collective memory of communities” (Grugel 
2002: 247). However, whilst a democratizing trend is apparent, it is also far from 
inevitable that this will globalize and that current authoritarian regimes will 
democratize. Countries like China and Saudi Arabia have no collective memory of 
democracy, have achieved economic growth without democracy and are sufficiently 
influential in the world to be subjected to only gentle external pressure to reform 
through fear of causing offence.  
 
Nevertheless, even in some of the world’s least open societies, where democracy has 
never been tried out, people are slowly becoming more aware of what they have not 
got. The Chinese government crushed the pro-democracy protests of 1989 but 
democracy’s proliferation elsewhere that year and the global exposure of this tyranny 
ensures that the movement for democracy in China lives on. A movement demanding 
greater rights for women has emerged in Saudi Arabia over the last decade despite 
profound difficulties in accessing or voicing feminist ideas in such a highly 
patriarchal and censorial country. In a move which epitomized the democratising 
potential of globalization and information technology, activists in 2008 posted a video 
on the internet of a Saudi woman driving a car, a practise illegal in the country. The 
idea of democracy has globalized beyond its practise and, in an era of increasingly 
global mass communication, this makes it harder and harder for authoritarian 
governments to resist its waves.   
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ESSAY QUESTIONS 
 
1. Describe and explain the phenomenon of democratization. 
 
2. “History shows us that it is possible to successfully democratize countries  
through foreign occupation” Do you agree or disagree with this assertion in 
the light of the Afghan and Iraqi occupations since 2001?  
 
3. Why do IR theories differ in terms of the level of significance they attach to 
democratization? 
 
REFLECTIVE QUESTION- Are you a representative or popular democrat 
(if a democrat at all)? 
 
List any issues which in your country you imagine could command popular 
support in a referendum but which you personally would not support (for example- 
on whether or not to have the death penalty for murder). Would you ; a) accept 
these decisions being implemented for your country despite them being against 
your own views or b) consider that some issues cannot be accepted as legitimate, 
even if they do have popular support because they are not in the interests of ‘the 
people’. 
 
If you have answered a) you appear to support popular democracy. If you have 
answered b) you appear to prefer representative forms of democracy (or, possibly, 
do not support democracy at all). 
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RECOMMENDED READING 
 
L. Diamond (2008) The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies 
Throughout the World. New York: Times Books. 
A comprehensive analysis of democratization using case studies of countries that have 
recently slid back from democracy to puncture the optimism of Fukuyama’s ’End of 
History’ thesis. Ultimately, however, this is not a pessimistic dismissal of liberal 
support for democratization but the views of a more cautionary proponent of 
democratic promotion who sees the process as being more complex and long-term 
than most other analysts.  
 
J. Grugel (2002) Democratization. A Critical Introduction, Basingstoke, UK : 
Palgrave. 
In an impressive academic critique of the democratization literature, which is broad 
and often incoherent, Grugel thinks clearly about what democracy actually is and 
about how democratization can occur. 
 
The Journal of Democracy 
This pre-eminent journal is an invaluable source for research in this area, having 
published many seminal articles on case studies and the theory of democratization. 
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WEBSITES 
 
Freedom House  
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1 
Well-known US pressure group who produce an annual ‘Freedom in the World’ 
report which gives a democratic rating and assessment for all countries. 
 
Polity IV 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
An extensive academic database containing widely-cited statistics, graphs and 
analysis on democratization and other related aspects of international politics. 
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